Перевод: со всех языков на английский

с английского на все языки

mode of reasoning

  • 1 спосіб розумування

    cognitive style, mode of reasoning

    Українсько-англійський юридичний словник > спосіб розумування

  • 2 inductio

    in-ductĭo, ōnis, f. [id.], a leading [p. 938] or bringing into, introducing, admission (class.).
    I.
    Lit.:

    nos aquarum inductionibus terris fecunditatem damus,

    Cic. N. D. 2, 60, 152:

    horum (juvenum in circum),

    introduction, exhibition, Liv. 44, 9, 5;

    so on the stage: ficta personarum,

    Cic. de Or. 3, 53, 205:

    prima trullis frequentetur inductio,

    a plastering, Pall. 1, 15.—Of a striking out, erasing of writing (cf. induco, 1. C. 3.):

    lituras, inductiones, superductiones ipse feci,

    Dig. 28, 4, 1.—
    B.
    Transf., concr.
    1.
    An awning drawn over a theatre to protect the audience from the sun, Vitr. 10 praef.—
    2.
    A fomentation, Cael. Aur. Acut. 2, 27, 216.—
    II.
    Trop.
    A.
    In gen. (acc. to induco II. B. 2. b.), a purpose, resolution, inclination, intention:

    animi,

    Cic. Q. Fr. 1, 11, 32; id. Fam. 1, 8, 2:

    cedet profecto virtuti dolor et animi inductione languescet,

    id. Tusc. 2, 13, 31.—
    B.
    In partic., rhet. t. t.
    1.
    Induction, a mode of reasoning from known particulars to generals, the Gr. epagôgê, Cic. Top. 10, 42; id. Inv. 1, 31, 51; Quint. 5, 10, 73; 5, 11, 2 sq.:

    erroris,

    id. 9, 1, 31.—
    2.
    Personarum ficta, = prosôpopoiïa, the introduction of a fictitious person, Cic. de Or. 3, 53, 205.—
    3.
    Erroris inductio, = apoplanêsis, a leading into error, misguiding, Cic. de Or. 3, 53, 205.—
    4.
    An assumption, supposition, Prisc. 1144 P.

    Lewis & Short latin dictionary > inductio

  • 3 raisonnement

    raisonnement [ʀεzɔnmɑ̃]
    masculine noun
       a. ( = activité) reasoning uncount ; ( = façon de réfléchir) way of thinking ; ( = cheminement de la pensée) thought process
    • raisonnement économique/politique economic/political thinking
       b. ( = argumentation) argument
    * * *
    ʀɛzɔnmɑ̃
    nom masculin
    1) ( suite d'arguments) reasoning [U] ( sur about)
    2) ( type de pensée) thinking
    •
    Phrasal Verbs:
    * * *
    ʀɛzɔnmɑ̃ nm
    1) (= logique, mode de pensée) reasoning
    2) (= argumentation) argument, reasoning

    J'ai du mal à suivre son raisonnement. — I have difficulty following his reasoning.

    * * *
    1 ( suite d'arguments) reasoning ¢ (sur about); un raisonnement confus/solide confused/sound reasoning; les lacunes de ton raisonnement the gaps in your reasoning; suivre le raisonnement de qn to follow sb's reasoning; tous les raisonnements sous-jacents all the underlying reasoning; faire le même raisonnement pour to apply the same reasoning to; selon le même raisonnement by the same argument; faire le raisonnement que to argue that; il tient le raisonnement suivant his argument is as follows; je ne tiens pas le même raisonnement I have a different way of reasoning; tu ne feras jamais rien avec ce genre de raisonnement you won't get anywhere with that sort of thinking;
    2 ( opération de la pensée) reasoning; raisonnement logique/analogique/pratique logical/analogical/practical reasoning; mode/forme /méthode de raisonnement way/form/method of reasoning; fondé sur le raisonnement based on reason;
    3 ( type de pensée) thinking; raisonnement économique/politique economic/political thinking.
    raisonnement par l'absurde reductio ad absurdum.
    [rɛzɔnmɑ̃] nom masculin
    1. [faculté, réflexion]
    raisonnement déductif/inductif deductive/inductive reasoning
    2. [argumentation] reasoning
    la conclusion de mon raisonnement est la suivante after careful thought, I have come to the following conclusion

    Dictionnaire Français-Anglais > raisonnement

  • 4 Artificial Intelligence

       In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)
       Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)
       Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....
       When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)
       4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually
       Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)
       What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)
       The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)
       9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form
       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:
        Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."
        Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)
       Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)
       Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)
       The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)
        14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation
       It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)
       We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.
       Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.
       Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.
    ... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)
       Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)
        16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts
       Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)
       Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System
       Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence
       The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.
       The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)
       The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....
       AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)
        21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions
       In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)
       Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)
       Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)
       The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence

  • 5 Kombination

    f; -, -en
    1. combination ( auch Schach, MATH., TECH. etc., auch eines Schlosses); alpine / nordische Kombination Alpine / Nordic combination
    2. Ballspiele: (concerted) move; (Ballpassage) sequence ( oder string) of passes; eine tolle Kombination a lovely move
    3. Kleidung: matching jacket and trousers (Am. pants) ( oder skirt etc.) Pl., ensemble, bes. Am. outfit; (Fliegerkombination) flying suit; (Arbeitsanzug) overalls Pl., Am. coverall
    4. (Folgerung) deduction; Kombinationen anstellen make deductions, put two and two together
    * * *
    die Kombination
    combination
    * * *
    Kom|bi|na|ti|on [kɔmbina'tsioːn]
    f -, -en
    1) (= Verbindung, Zusammenstellung, Zahlenkombination) combination; (SPORT = Zusammenspiel) concerted move, (piece of) teamwork

    alpine/nordische Kombinatión (Ski) — Alpine/Nordic combination

    2) (= Schlussfolgerung) deduction, reasoning; (= Vermutung) conjecture
    3) (= Kleidung) suit, ensemble; (= Hemdhose) combinations pl, combs pl (inf); (= Arbeitsanzug) overalls pl, boiler suit; (= Fliegerkombination) flying suit
    * * *
    die
    1) ((the result of) combining or being combined: The town was a combination of old and new architecture.) combination
    2) (a set of numbers used to open certain types of lock: He couldn't open the safe as he had forgotten the combination; ( also adjective) a combination lock.) combination
    * * *
    Kom·bi·na·ti·on
    <-, -en>
    [kɔmbinaˈtsi̯o:n]
    f
    1. (Zusammenstellung) combination
    2. (Zahlenkombination) combination
    3. (Schlussfolgerung) deduction, conclusion
    4. MODE (Zusammenstellung von Kleidungsstücken) combination[s pl]; (Overall) flying suit, jumpsuit
    nordische \Kombination SKI Nordic combination
    * * *
    die; Kombination, Kombinationen
    1) (auch Schach) combination
    2) (gedankliche Verknüpfung) deduction; piece of reasoning
    3) (Kleidungsstücke) ensemble; suit; (HerrenKombination) suit; (FliegerKombination) flying-suit
    4) (Ballspiele) combined move
    * * *
    Kombination f; -, -en
    1. combination ( auch Schach, MATH, TECH etc, auch eines Schlosses);
    alpine/nordische Kombination Alpine/Nordic combination
    2. Ballspiele: (concerted) move; (Ballpassage) sequence ( oder string) of passes;
    eine tolle Kombination a lovely move
    3. Kleidung: matching jacket and trousers (US pants) ( oder skirt etc) pl, ensemble, besonders US outfit; (Fliegerkombination) flying suit; (Arbeitsanzug) overalls pl, US coverall
    4. (Folgerung) deduction;
    Kombinationen anstellen make deductions, put two and two together
    * * *
    die; Kombination, Kombinationen
    1) (auch Schach) combination
    2) (gedankliche Verknüpfung) deduction; piece of reasoning
    3) (Kleidungsstücke) ensemble; suit; (HerrenKombination) suit; (FliegerKombination) flying-suit
    4) (Ballspiele) combined move
    * * *
    f.
    combination n.

    Deutsch-Englisch Wörterbuch > Kombination

  • 6 हेतुः _hētuḥ

    हेतुः [हि-तुन् Uṇ.1.73]
    1 Cause, reason, object, mo- tive; इति हेतुस्तदुद्भवे K. P.1; Māl.1.23; R.1.1; नीचैराख्यं गिरिमधिवसेस्तत्र विश्रामहेतोः Me.25; Ś.3.12.
    -2 Source, origin; स पिता पितरस्तासां केवलं जन्महेतवः R.1.24 'authors of their being'.
    -3 A means or instrument.
    -4 The logical reason, the reason for an inference, middle term (forming the second member of the five- membered syllogism).
    -5 Logic, science of reasoning.
    -6 Any logical proof or argument.
    -7 A rhetorical reason (regarded by some writers as a figure of speech); it is thus defined:-- हेताहतुमता सार्धमभेदो हेतुरुच्यते.
    -8 (In gram.) The agent of the causal verb; P.I.4.55.
    -9 (with Buddhists) Primary cause.
    -1 (with Pāśu- patas) The external world and senses (that cause the bondage of the soul).
    -11 Mode, manner.
    -12 Condi- tion.
    -13 Price, cost; दीन्नाराणां दशशती पञ्चाशदधिकाभवत् । धान्यखारीक्रये हेतुर्देशे दुर्भिक्षविक्षते Rāj. T.5.71. (N. B. The forms हेतुना, हेतोः, rarely हेतौ, are used adverbially in the sense of 'by reason of', 'on account of', 'because of', with gen. or in comp.; तमसा बहुरूपेण वेष्टिताः कर्महेतुना Ms. 1.49; शास्त्रविज्ञानहेतुना; अल्पस्य हेतोर्बहु हातुमिच्छन् R.2.47; विस्मृतं कस्य हेतोः Mu.1.1. &c.).
    -Comp. -अपदेशः ad- ducing the hetu (in the form of the five-membered syl- logism).
    -अवधारणम् (in dram.) reasoning.
    -आक्षेप (in Rhet.) an objection accompanied with reasons; न स्तूयसे नरेन्द्र त्वं ददासीति कदाचन । स्वमेव मत्वा गृह्णन्ति यतस्त्वद्धन- मर्थिनः ॥ इत्येवमादिराक्षेपो हेत्वाक्षेप इति स्मृतः । Kāv.2.167-168.
    -आभासः 'the semblance of a reason', a fallacious middle term, fallacy; (it is of five kinds:-- सव्यभिचार or अनैकान्तिक, विरुद्ध, असिद्ध, सत्प्रतिपक्ष and बाधित).
    -उत्प्रेक्षा, -उपमा a simile accompanied with reasons.
    -उपक्षेपः, -उपन्यासः adducing a reason, statement of an argu- ment.
    -कर्तृ m. the causal subject; याजयेदिति हेतुकर्तु रेवैतत् प्रत्यक्षं वचनम्, लक्षणया यजेः कर्तुः ŚB. on MS.1.8.39.
    -दुष्ट a. unreasonable.
    -दृष्टिः scepticism.
    -बलिक a. strong in argument.
    -युक्त a. well-founded.
    -रूपकम् a meta- phor accompanied with reasons.
    -वादः 1 disputation, controversy.
    -2 fraud (कपट); न हेतुवादाल्लोभाद्वा धर्मं जह्यां कथंचन Mb.5.91.24.
    -3 assigning a cause (sceptically); न यक्ष्यन्ति न होष्यन्ति हेतुवादविमोहिताः Mb.3.19.26.
    -वादिन् 1 a disputant.
    -2 a sceptic.
    -विशेषोक्तिः a mention of difference accompanied with reasons; एकचक्रो रथो यन्ता विकलो विषमा हयाः । आक्रामत्येव तेजस्वी तथाप्यर्को नभस्तलम् ॥ सैषा हेतुविशेषोक्तिस्तेजस्वीति विशेषणात् ॥ Kāv.2.328-329.
    -शास्त्रम् a logically-treated work, any beretical work questioning the authority of Smṛitis or revelation; यो$वमन्येत ते मूले हेतुशास्त्राश्रयाद् द्विजः Ms.2.11.
    -हेतुमत् m. du. cause and effect. ˚भावः the relation existing between cause and effect.

    Sanskrit-English dictionary > हेतुः _hētuḥ

  • 7 ratiō

        ratiō ōnis, f    [RA-], a reckoning, numbering, casting up, account, calculation, computation: ut par sit ratio acceptorum et datorum: quibus in tabulis ratio confecta erat, qui numerus domo exisset, etc., Cs.: auri ratio constat, the account tallies: rationem argenti ducere, reckoning: pecuniae habere rationem, to take an account: ratione initā, on casting up the account, Cs.: mihimet ineunda ratio est: (pecuniam) in rationem inducere, bring into their accounts: aeraria, the rate of exchange (the value of money of one standard in that of another): rationes ad aerarium continuo detuli, rendered accounts: rationes cum publicanis putare: rationes a colono accepit: longis rationibus assem in partīs diducere, calculations, H.— A list, manifest, protocol, report, statement: cedo rationem carceris, quae diligentissime conficitur.— A transaction, business, matter, affair, concern, circumstance: re ac ratione cum aliquo coniunctus: in publicis privatisque rationibus, Cs.: nummaria: popularis: comitiorum: ad omnem rationem humanitatis: meam.—Plur., with pron poss., account, interest, advantage: alquis in meis rationibus tibi adiungendus: alienum suis rationibus existimans, etc., inconsistent with his interests, S.—Fig., a reckoning, account, settlement, computation, explanation: rationem reddere earum rerum: secum has rationes putare, T.: initā subductāque ratione scelera meditantes, i. e. after full deliberation: quod posteaquam iste cognovit, hanc rationem habere coepit, reflection: totius rei consilium his rationibus explicabat, ut si, etc., upon the following calculation, Cs.: ut habere rationem possis, quo loco me convenias, etc., i. e. means of determining: semper ita vivamus, ut rationem reddendam nobis arbitremur, must account to ourselves: si gravius quid acciderit, abs te rationem reposcent, will hold you responsible, Cs.— Relation, reference, respect, connection, community: (agricolae) habent rationem cum terrā, quae, etc., have to do: cum omnibus Musis rationem habere: omnes, quibuscum ratio huic est.— A respect, regard, concern, consideration, care: utriusque (sc. naturae et fortunae) omnino habenda ratio est in deligendo genere vitae: (deos) piorum et impiorum habere rationem: sauciorum et aegrorum habitā ratione, Cs.: propter rationem brevitatis, out of regard for: habeo rationem, quid a populo R. acceperim, consider: neque illud rationis habuisti, provinciam ad summam stultitiam venisse? did you not consider?—Course, conduct, procedure, mode, manner, method, fashion, plan, principle: tua ratio est, ut... mea, ut, etc.: defensionis ratio viaque: itaque in praesentiā Pompei sequendi rationem omittit, Cs.: in philosophiā disserendi: ut, quo primum curreretur, vix ratio iniri possit, Cs.: hoc aditu laudis vitae meae rationes prohibuerunt, plan of life.—Arrangement, relation, condition, kind, fashion, way, manner, style: ratio atque usus belli, the art and practice of war, Cs.: novae bellandi rationes, Cs.: quorum operum haec erat ratio, etc., Cs.: rationem pontis hanc instituit; tigna bina, etc., Cs.: iuris: haec eadem ratio est in summā totius Galliae, Cs.: eādem ratione, quā pridie, ab nostris resistitur, Cs: quid refert, quā me ratione cogatis?: nullā ratione, Cs.: tota ratio talium largitionum genere vitiosa est, principle.—The faculty of computing, judgment, understanding, reason, reasoning, reflection: Ita fit, ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet: homo, quod rationis est particeps, causas rerum videt: lex est ratio summa: ut, quos ratio non posset, eos ad officium religio duceret: si ratio et prudentia curas aufert, H.: mulier abundat audaciā, consilio et ratione deficitur: Arma amens capio, nec sat rationis in armis, V.: ratione fecisti, sensibly.—Ground, motive, reason: quid tandem habuit argumenti aut rationis res, quam ob rem, etc.: nostra confirmare argumentis ac rationibus: noverit orator argumentorum et rationum locos: ad eam sententiam haec ratio eos deduxit, quod, etc., Cs.: rationibus conquisitis de voluptate disputandum putant: Num parva causa aut prava ratiost? reason, excuse, T.— Reasonableness, reason, propriety, law, rule, order: omnia, quae ratione docentur et viā, reasonably and regularly: ut ratione et viā procedat oratio: quae res ratione modoque Tractari non volt, H.: intervallis pro ratā parte ratione distinctis, divided proportionally by rule: vincit ipsa rerum p. natura saepe rationem, system.—A theory, doctrine, system, science: haec nova et ignota ratio, solem lunae oppositum solere deficere: Epicuri, doctrine: Stoicorum: ratio vivendi... ratio civilis, the art of living... statesmanship.—Knowledge, science. si qua (est in me) huiusce rei ratio aliqua.— A view, opinion, conviction: Mea sic est ratio, T.: cum in eam rationem pro suo quisque sensu loqueretur: cuius ratio etsi non valuit, N.
    * * *
    I II
    account, reckoning; plan; prudence; method; reasoning; rule; regard

    Latin-English dictionary > ratiō

  • 8 ratio

    rătĭo, onis (abl. rationi, Lucr. 6, 66), f. [reor, ratus], a reckoning, account, calculation, computation.
    I.
    Lit.
    (α).
    Sing.: Les. Nequaquam argenti ratio conparet tamen. Sta. Ratio quidem hercle adparet: argentum oichetai, Plaut. Trin. 2, 4, 15 sq.:

    rationem putare... bene ratio accepti atque expensi inter nos convenit,

    id. Most. 1, 3, 141; 146; cf.: ad calculos vocare amicitiam, ut par sit ratio acceptorum et datorum, Cic. Lael. 16, 58:

    itur, putatur ratio cum argentario... Ubi disputata est ratio cum argentario,

    Plaut. Aul. 3, 5, 53 sq.:

    dextera digitis rationem computat,

    id. Mil. 2, 2, 49:

    magna ratio C. Verruci,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 77, § 188:

    direptio ejus pecuniae, cujus ratio in aede Opis confecta est,

    id. Phil. 5, 6, 16; cf.:

    quibus in tabulis nominatim, ratio confecta erat, qui numerus domo exisset, etc.,... Quarum omnium rerum summa erat, etc.,

    Caes. B. G. 1, 29: auri ratio constat: aurum in aerario est, the account agrees, i. e. is correct, Cic. Fl. 28, 69 (v. consto):

    decumo post mense, ut rationem te dictare intellego,

    to make the reckoning, Plaut. Am. 2, 2, 38 (al. ductare):

    rationem ducere,

    to make a computation, to compute, calculate, reckon, Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 52, § 129; so, rationem habere, to take an account, make a computation:

    omnium proeliorum,

    Caes. B. C. 3, 53; cf.:

    hujus omnis pecuniae conjunctim ratio habetur,

    id. B. G. 6, 19; and:

    piratarum,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 28, § 71:

    rationem inire,

    to cast up, reckon, calculate, Caes. B. G. 7, 71, 4:

    quattuor minae periere, ut ratio redditur,

    Plaut. Men. 1, 3, 23; cf.:

    tibi ego rationem reddam?

    id. Aul. 1, 1, 6; id. Trin. 2, 4, 114:

    rationem referre,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 39, § 98:

    rationem repetere de pecuniis repetundis,

    id. Clu. 37, 104: Py. Quanta istaec hominum summa est? Ar. Septem millia. Py. Tantum esse oportet:

    recte rationem tenes,

    Plaut. Mil. 1, 1, 47 et saep.:

    drachumae, quas de ratione debuisti,

    according to the account, id. Trin. 2, 4, 24:

    grandem (pecuniam) quemadmodum in rationem inducerent, non videbant,

    how they should bring it into their accounts, Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 41, § 106.—
    (β).
    Plur.: rationes putare argentariam, frumentariam, pabuli causa quae parata sunt;

    rationem vinariam, oleariam, quid venierit, etc.,

    Cato, R. R. 2, 5:

    rationes ad aerarium continuo detuli... quas rationes si cognoris, intelleges, etc.,

    Cic. Pis. 25, 61:

    ut rationes cum publicanis putarent,

    id. Att. 4, 11, 1:

    rationes a colono accepit,

    id. Caecin. 32, 94:

    quid opus est? inquam. Rationes conferatis. Assidunt, subducunt, ad nummum convenit,

    id. Att. 5, 21, 12:

    rationes referre... rationes deferre,

    id. Fam. 5, 20, 2:

    Romani pueri longis rationibus assem Discunt in partes centum diducere,

    Hor. A. P. 325 et saep.:

    A RATIONIBVS,

    an accountant, Inscr. Orell. 1494; 2973; 2986; 4173 et saep. (cf. ab).—
    B.
    Transf.
    1.
    A list, roll, register (rare):

    cedo rationem carceris, quae diligentissime conficitur, quo quisque die datus in custodiam, quo mortuus, quo necatus sit,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 57, § 147:

    rationes imperii, ab Augusto proponi solitas, sed a Tiberio intermissas, publicavit (sc. Caligula),

    Suet. Calig. 16 ( = breviarium) totius imperii, id. Aug. 101 fin.:

    rationarium imperii,

    id. ib. 28.—
    2.
    A sum, number (rare), Plaut. Trin. 2, 4, 11:

    nunc lenonum et scortorum plus est fere Quam olim muscarum est. Ea nimia est ratio,

    id. Truc. 1, 1, 49:

    pro ratione pecuniae liberalius est Brutus tractatus quam Pompeius,

    Cic. Att. 6, 3, 5; cf. II. B. 1. c. infra.—
    3.
    A business matter, transaction, business; also, a matter, affair, in gen. (a favorite word of Cicero):

    res rationesque eri Ballionis curo,

    Plaut. Ps. 2, 2, 31:

    res rationesque vestrorum omnium,

    id. Am. prol. 4:

    re ac ratione cum aliquo conjunctus,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 70, § 172:

    de tota illa ratione atque re Gallicana inter se multa communicare,

    id. Quint. 4, 15:

    cum (Druides) in reliquis fere rebus, publicis privatisque rationibus, Graecis utantur litteris,

    Caes. B. G. 6, 14 (metaphrast. pragmasi):

    ratio nummaria,

    Cic. Att. 10, 11, 2:

    aeraria ratio,

    id. Quint. 4, 15:

    ratio domestica... bellica,

    id. Off. 1, 22, 76:

    quod ad popularem rationem attinet,

    id. Fam. 1, 2, 4:

    rationes familiares componere,

    Tac. A. 6, 16 fin.:

    fori judiciique rationem Messala suscepit,

    Cic. Rosc. Am. 51, 149; cf.:

    in explicandis rationibus rerum civilium,

    id. Rep. 1, 8, 13:

    rationes civitatis,

    id. ib. 1, 6, 11:

    quantos aestus habet ratio comitiorum... nihil fallacius ratione tota comitiorum,

    id. Mur. 17, 35:

    propter rationem Gallici belli,

    id. Prov. Cons. 8, 19; so id. ib. 8, 14, 35:

    ad omnem rationem humanitatis,

    id. Mur. 31, 66: in hac ratione quid res, quid causa, quid tempus ferat, tu facillime perspicies, id. Fam. 1, 7, 6 fin.:

    ad eam rationem existimabam satis aptam naturam meam,

    id. Att. 9, 11, A, 1.—
    b.
    Pregn.: meae (tuae, etc.) rationes, my ( thy, etc.) interest, my ( thy, etc.) advantage (cf. in Engl. to find one's account in any thing):

    me ad ejus rationes adjungo, quem tu in meis rationibus tibi esse adjungendum putasti,

    Cic. Fam. 1, 8, 2; cf.:

    exemplum meis alienissimum rationibus,

    id. Corn. Fragm. 1, 7 B. and K.:

    consideres, quid tuae rationes postulent,

    Sall. C. 44, 5: servitia repudiabat... alienum suis rationibus existimans videri causam civium cum servis fugitivis communicasse, inconsistent with his policy or interests, id. ib. 56, 5:

    si meas rationes unquam vestrae saluti anteposuissem,

    Cic. Red. ad Quir. 1, 1.
    II.
    Trop., a reckoning, account, computation:

    postquam hanc rationem cordi ventrique edidi,

    presented this reckoning, Plaut. Aul. 2, 7, 12:

    itidem hic ut Acheronti ratio accepti scribitur,

    i.e. things are taken only, nothing is given back, id. Truc. 4, 2, 36:

    nomen (comoediae) jam habetis, nunc rationes ceteras Accipite,

    an account of the rest, id. Poen. prol. 55; cf.:

    census quom sum, juratori recte rationem dedi,

    id. Trin. 4, 2, 30; so,

    rationem dare, for the more usual rationem reddere,

    Varr. L. L. 6, § 86 Mull.; Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 36, § 92 Zumpt:

    (argentarii) ratione utuntur,

    make a reckoning, settle up, Plaut. Cas. prol. 27:

    cum eam mecum rationem puto,

    go into that calculation, think over the matter, id. ib. 3, 2, 25; cf.:

    frustra egomet mecum has rationes puto,

    Ter. Ad. 2, 1, 54:

    (Medea et Atreus) inita subductaque ratione nefaria scelera meditantes,

    Cic. N. D. 3, 29, 71:

    quod posteaquam iste cognovit hanc rationem habere coepit,

    to make the following calculation, reflection, id. Verr. 2, 5, 39, § 101; cf.: totius rei consilium his rationibus explicavit, ut si, etc.,... si, etc.,... sin, etc., drew the plan of the whole undertaking according to the following calculation, that if, etc., Caes. B. C. 3, 78;

    and herewith cf.: rationem consilii mei accipite,

    id. ib. 3, 86:

    ut habere rationem possis, quo loco me convenias, etc.,

    that you may calculate, Cic. Fam. 3, 6, 6:

    semper ita vivamus, ut rationem reddendam nobis arbitremur,

    id. Verr. 2, 2, 11, § 28; cf.:

    nihil est, quod minus ferendum sit, quam rationem ab altero vitae reposcere eum, qui non possit suae reddere,

    id. Div. in Caecil. 9, 28;

    and with this cf.: si gravius quid acciderit, abs te rationem reposcent,

    will call you to account, Caes. B. G. 5, 30: clarorum virorum atque magnorum non minus otii, quam negotii rationem exstare oportere, an account must be capable of being given, Cato ap. Cic. Planc. 27, 66:

    tam otii quam negotii rationem reddere majores censuisse,

    Col. 11 fin.: eam condicionem esse imperandi, ut non aliter ratio constet, quam si uni reddatur, that the account is not correct unless, etc., Tac. A. 1, 6 fin.:

    mirum est quam singulis diebus in urbe ratio aut constet aut constare videatur,

    Plin. Ep. 1, 9, 1; 1, 5, 16 et saep.; cf. Just. praef. 5.—
    B.
    Transf.
    1.
    Relation, reference, respect to a thing:

    (agricolae) habent rationem cum terra, quae nunquam recusat imperium,

    have an account, have to do, have dealings with the earth, Cic. Sen. 15, 51; cf.:

    ubi ratio cum Orco habetur,

    Varr. R. R. 1, 4, 3;

    for which: ubi sit cum Orco ratio ponenda,

    Col. 1, 3, 2:

    cum omnibus Musis rationem habere cogito,

    Cic. Att. 2, 5, 2:

    cum hac (muliere) aliquid adulescentem hominem habuisse rationis,

    id. Cael. 20, 50; cf. id. Verr. 2, 2, 77, § 190. omnes, quibuscum ratio huic aut est aut fuit, assunt, defendunt, id. Quint. 23, 75; cf.

    . quae ratio tibi cum eo intercesserat?

    id. Rosc. Com. 14, 41:

    pacis vero quae potest esse cum eo ratio, in quo est incredibilis crudelitas, fides nulla?

    id. Phil. 4, 6, 14:

    quod si habenda cum M. Antonii latrocinio pacis ratio fuit, etc.,

    id. ib. 12, 7, 17:

    fontes ad nostrorum annalium rationem veteres, ad ipsorum sane recentes,

    in respect to our annals, id. Brut. 13, 49.—
    b.
    Pregn., a respect, regard, concern, consideration, care for a thing (usu. in the connection habere and ducere alicujus rei rationem): ad hanc rationem quoniam maximam vim natura habet, fortuna proximam: utriusque omnino habenda ratio est in deligendo genere vitae, Cic. Off. 1, 33, 120:

    quorum (civium Romanorum) nobis pro vestra sapientia, Quirites, habenda est ratio diligenter,

    id. Imp. Pomp. 7, 17:

    (deos) piorum et impiorum habere rationem,

    id. Leg. 2, 7, 15:

    cujus absentis rationem haberi proximis comitiis populus jussisset,

    Caes. B. C. 1, 9; so,

    absentis,

    id. ib. 1, 32; 3, 82 fin.:

    sauciorum et aegrorum habita ratione,

    id. ib. 3, 75:

    moneret, frumenti rationem esse habendam,

    Hirt. B. G. 8, 34;

    so (al. frumentandi), rationem habere,

    Caes. B. G. 7, 75 Oud.; cf. id. ib. 7, 71:

    alicujus vel dignitatis vel commodi rationem non habere,

    Cic. de Or. 2, 4, 17: ut summae rei publicae rationem habeamus, Pompeius ap. Cic. Att. 8, 12, c, 3:

    alicujus salutis rationem habere,

    i. e. to regard, care for, be concerned about, Caes. B. G. 7, 71; so id. B. C. 1, 20:

    turpissimae fugae rationem habere,

    id. ib. 2, 31:

    ut in ceteris habenda ratio non sui solum sed etiam aliorum, sic, etc.,

    Cic. Off. 1, 39, 139:

    proinde habeat rationem posteritatis et periculi sui,

    Caes. B. C. 1, 13:

    habere nunc se rationem officii pro beneficiis Caesaris,

    id. B. G. 5, 27:

    non ullius rationem sui commodi ducit,

    Cic. Rosc. Am. 44, 128:

    cum hujusce periculi tum ceterorum quoque officiorum et amicitiarum ratio,

    id. Clu. 42, 117:

    omnis hac in re habenda ratio et diligentia est, ut, etc.,

    id. Lael. 24, 89; cf.:

    didici ex tuis litteris, te omnibus in rebus habuisse rationem, ut mihi consuleres,

    id. Fam. 3, 5, 1:

    habeo rationem, quid a populo Romano acceperim,

    bring into consideration, consider, id. Verr. 2, 5, 14, § 36:

    ut habere rationem possis, quo loco me salva lege Cornelia convenias, ego veni, etc.,

    id. Fam. 3, 6, 6:

    neque illud rationis habuisti, eam provinciam ad summam stultitiam nequitiamque venisse,

    id. Verr. 2, 5, 15, § 38; cf.:

    hoc rationis habebant, facere eos nullo modo posse, ut, etc.,

    id. ib. 2, 2, 29, e70.—
    c.
    Relation to a thing, i. e.
    (α).
    Subject., course, conduct, procedure, mode, manner, method, fashion, plan, etc. (cf. consilium):

    nunc sic rationem incipissam, hanc instituam astutiam, ut, etc.,

    Plaut. Mil. 2, 2, 82; cf. id. ib. 3, 1, 175 sqq.:

    ubi cenas hodic, si hanc rationem instituis?

    Plaut. Stich. 3, 1, 26; id. Truc. 1, 1, 3:

    tua ratio est, ut secundum binos ludos mihi respondere incipias: mea, ut ante primos ludos comperendinem. Ita fiet, ut tua ista ratio existimetur astuta, meum hoc consilium necessarium,

    Cic. Verr. 1, 11, 34; cf.:

    ratio viaque defensionis,

    id. Verr. 2, 5, 1, § 4:

    itaque in praesentia Pompeii insequendi rationem omittit,

    Caes. B. C. 1, 30:

    mea autem ratio in dicendo haec esse solet, ut, etc.,

    Cic. de Or. 2, 72, 292:

    haec in philosophia ratio contra omnia disserendi,

    id. N. D. 1, 5, 11:

    dicendi,

    id. Or. 32, 114; id. de Or. 3, 15, 56; cf.:

    aliquot ante annis inita ratio est, ut, etc.,

    id. Rep. 2, 36, 61:

    ut, quo primum occurreretur, vix ratio iniri possit,

    Caes. B. G. 7, 24:

    quia reponendarum (tegularum) nemo artifex inire rationem potuerit,

    Liv. 42, 3 fin. —In plur.:

    hoc aditu laudis non mea me voluntas sed meae vitae rationes ab ineunte aetate susceptae prohibuerunt,

    plan of life, Cic. Imp. Pomp. 1, 1:

    de rationibus rerum publicarum aut constituendarum aut tuendarum,

    id. Rep. 1, 6, 11.—
    (β).
    Object., relation, condition, nature, kind, sort, fashion, way, etc. (cf. modus):

    sed ratio ordoque agminis aliter se habebat ac Belgae ad Nervios detulerant,

    Caes. B. G. 2, 19; cf.:

    ut rei militaris ratio atque ordo postulabat,

    id. ib. 2, 22; so,

    rei militaris,

    id. ib. 4, 23:

    ratio atque usus belli,

    the art and practice of war, id. ib. 4, 1; id. B. C. 1, 76 fin.; 2, 18; 3, 17 et saep. al.; cf.:

    novae rationes bellandi,

    id. ib. 3, 50:

    ratio equestris proelii,

    id. B. G. 5, 16:

    quorum operum haec erat ratio, etc.,

    id. B. C. 1, 25; cf.: rationem pontis hanc instituit;

    tigna bina, etc.,

    id. B. G. 4, 17:

    serpit per omnium vitas amicitia, nec ullam aetatis degendae rationem patitur esse expertem sui,

    Cic. Lael. 23, 87; cf.:

    ita ratio comparata est vitae naturaeque nostrae, ut, etc.,

    id. ib. 27, 101; id. Ac. 2, 43, 132:

    civitas (Platonis) non quae possit esse, sed in qua ratio rerum civilium perspici posset,

    id. Rep. 2, 30, 52 init.; cf.:

    reliqui disseruerunt de generibus et de rationibus civitatum,

    id. ib. 2, 11, 22;

    1, 8, 13: quam creberrimis litteris faciam ut tibi nota sit omnis ratio dierum atque itinerum meorum,

    id. Fam. 3, 5, 4: quoniam eadem est ratio juris in utroque, id. Rep. 3, 12, 21; cf.:

    haec eadem ratio est in summa totius Galliae,

    Caes. B. G. 6, 11 fin.:

    ab nostris eadem ratione, qua pridie, resistitur,

    id. ib. 5, 40; id. B. C. 3, 100; cf. id. ib. 3, 101:

    docet, longe alia ratione esse bellum gerendum atque antea sit gestum,

    id. B. G. 7, 14:

    hoc si Romae fieri posset, certe aliqua ratione expugnasset iste,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 52, ee130:

    quid refert, qua me ratione cogatis?

    id. Lael. 8, 26:

    quod fuit illis conandum atque omni ratione efficiendum,

    Caes. B. C. 1, 65 fin.; 1, 67 fin.:

    simili ratione Pompeius in suis castris consedit,

    id. ib. 3, 76:

    auxilium ferri nulla ratione poterat,

    id. ib. 1, 70:

    nec quibus rationibus superare possent, sed quem ad modum uti victoria deberent, cogitabant,

    id. ib. 3, 83 fin.; 3, 58; 3, 18 fin. et saep.—
    (γ).
    With gen. of a subst. in circumlocution for the subst. itself (v. Zumpt, Gram. §

    678): vereor ne oratio mea aliena ab judiciorum ratione esse videatur,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 4, 49, ee109:

    multa autem propter rationem brevitatis praetermittenda,

    id. ib. 2, 1, 40, ee

    103: quantas perturbationes et quantos aestus habet ratio comitiorum?

    id. Mur. 17, 35:

    nihil fallacius ratione tota comitiorum,

    id. ib. 17, 36:

    praedicere tempestatum rationem et praedonum,

    id. ib. 2, 4:

    tota ratio talium largitionum genere vitiosa est,

    id. Off. 2, 17, 60.—
    2.
    Pregn., that faculty of the mind which forms the basis of computation and calculation, and hence of mental action in general, i. e. judgment, understanding, reason: duplex est vis animorum atque natura: una pars in appetitu posita est, quae est hormê Graece, quae hominem huc et illuc rapit;

    altera in ratione, quae docet et explanat, quid faciendum, quid fugiendum sit. Ita fit, ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet,

    Cic. Off. 1, 28, 101:

    homo, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, causas rerum videt earumque progressus et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat rebusque praesentibus adjungit atque annectit futuras, facile totius vitae cursum videt ad eamque degendam praeparat res necessarias. Eademque natura vi rationis hominem concilia homini et ad orationis et ad vitae societatem, etc.,

    id. ib. 1, 4, 11 sq.:

    haud scio, an melius fuerit, humano generi motum istum celerem cogitationis, acumen, sollertiam, quam rationem vocamus, non dari omnino quam tam munifice et tam large dari, etc.,

    id. N. D. 2, 27, 69:

    lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae jubet ea, quae facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria. Eadem ratio, cum est in hominis mente confirmata et confecta, lex est,

    id. Leg. 1, 6, 18:

    ut, quos ratio non posset, eos ad officium religio duceret,

    id. N. D. 1, 42, 118:

    mens et ratio et consilium in senibus est,

    id. Sen. 19, 67; cf. Liv. 28, 28:

    si pudor quaeritur, si probitas, si fides, Mancinus haec attulit, si ratio, consilium, prudentia, Pompeius antistat,

    Cic. Rep. 3, 18, 28; cf. id. Quint. 16, 53; and:

    si ratio et prudentia curas aufert,

    Hor. Ep. 1, 11, 25:

    quibus in rebus temeritas et casus, non ratio nec consilium valet,

    Cic. Div. 2, 41, 85; cf.:

    illa de urbis situ revoces ad rationem quae a Romulo casu aut necessitate facta sunt,

    id. Rep. 2, 11, 22; and:

    moneo ut agentem te ratio ducat, non fortuna,

    Liv. 22, 39 fin.: mulier abundat audacia;

    consilio et ratione deficitur,

    Cic. Clu. 65, 184:

    Ariovistum magis ratione et consilio quam virtute vicisse. Cui rationi contra homines barbaros locus fuisset, etc.,

    Caes. B. G. 1, 40: arma amens capio;

    nec sat rationis in armis,

    Verg. A. 2, 314:

    rationis egens,

    id. ib. 8, 299 et saep.:

    iracundia dissidens a ratione,

    Cic. Rep. 1, 38, 60:

    majora quam hominum ratio consequi possit,

    id. ib. 1, 10, 15:

    quantum ratione provideri poterat,

    Caes. B. G. 7, 16 fin.:

    quantumque in ratione esset, exploratum habuit,

    Hirt. B. G. 8, 6 init.:

    nec majore ratione bellum administrari posse,

    Caes. B. C. 7, 21:

    minari divisoribus ratio non erat,

    it was not reasonable, was contrary to reason, Cic. Verr. 1, 9, 24; so, nulla ratio est, with an objectclause, id. Caecin. 5, 15; so,

    too, minime rationis est,

    Col. 3, 5, 3; cf. with dat.:

    Vitellianus exercitus, cui acquiescere Cremonae ratio fuit,

    which, as reason dictated, ought to have rested at Cremona, Tac. H. 3, 22:

    quod domi te inclusisti, ratione fecisti,

    reasonably, sensibly, judiciously, Cic. Att. 12, [p. 1527] 14, 3.—
    b.
    The reasonable cause of a thing, a ground, motive, reason:

    ratio est causa, quae demonstrat, verum esse id, quod intendimus, brevi subjectione. Rationis confirmatio est ea, quae pluribus argumentis corroborat breviter expositam rationem,

    Auct. Her. 2, 18, 28:

    quid tandem habuit argumenti aut rationis res, quamobrem, etc.,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 47, § 115; cf.:

    nostra confirmare argumentis ac rationibus: deinde contraria refutare,

    id. de Or. 2, 19, 80:

    noverit orator argumentorum et rationum locos,

    id. Or. 14, 44 (v. also argumentum):

    si mei consilii causam rationemque cognoverit,

    id. Div. in Caecil. 1, 1; cf.:

    ad eam sententiam cum reliquis causis haec quoque ratio eos deduxit, quod, etc.,

    Caes. B. G. 2, 10 fin.:

    quam habet rationem, non quaero aequitatis, sed ipsius improbitatis atque impudentiae?... facti, si non bonam, at aliquam rationem afferre,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 3, 85, e196; cf.:

    deinde nihil rationis affert, quamobrem, etc.,

    id. Caecin. 33, 96:

    non deest hoc loco copia rationum, quibus docere velitis, humanas esse formas deorum: primum quod, etc.... deinde quod, etc.... tertiam rationem affertis, quod, etc.,

    id. N. D. 1, 27, 76:

    et quidem, cur sic opinetur, rationem subicit,

    id. Div. 2, 50, 104:

    idcirco minus existimo te nihil nisi summa ratione fecisse,

    id. Att. 8, 11, D, §

    5: nunc non modo agendi rationem nullam habeo, sed ne cogitandi quidem,

    id. Fam. 4, 13, 3:

    rationes in ea disputatione a te collectae vetabant me rei publicae penitus diffidere,

    id. Fam. 5, 13, 3; cf. id. Ac. 2, 36, 116:

    rationibus conquisitis de voluptate et dolore disputandum putant,

    id. Fin. 1, 9, 31; cf.:

    quod cum disputando rationibusque docuisset,

    id. Rep. 1, 16, 25:

    his rationibus tam certis tamque illustribus opponuntur ab his, qui contra disputant primum labores, etc.,

    id. ib. 1, 3, 4 et saep.:

    num parva causa aut prava ratio est?

    reason, excuse, Ter. Eun. 3, 5, 27.—
    (β).
    In rhet., a showing cause, argument, reasoning in support of a proposition:

    ratio est, quae continet causam, quae si sublata sit, nihil in causa controversiae relinquatur, hoc modo: Orestes si accusetur matricidii, nisi hoc dicat, Jure feci, illa enim patrem meum occiderat, non habet defensionem,

    Cic. Inv. 1, 13, 18:

    ad propositum subjecta ratio, et item in distributis supposita ratio,

    id. de Or. 3, 54, 207; cf. Quint. 3, 11, 4; 5, 14, 1; 16; 7, 8, 3.—
    c.
    Reasonableness, reason, propriety, law, rule, order, conformity, etc.:

    in omnibus, quae ratione docentur et via, primum constituendum est, quid quidque sit, etc.,

    in a reasonable, regular manner, Cic. Or. 33, 116; cf.:

    ut ratione et via procedat oratio,

    id. Fin. 1, 9, 29:

    modo et ratione aliquid facere (along with recte atque ordine facere),

    id. Quint. 7, 28; cf.:

    quae res Nec modum habet neque consilium, ratione modoque Tractari non vult,

    Hor. S. 2, 3, 266:

    nihil est, quod ratione et numero moveri possit sine consilio,

    Cic. N. D. 2, 16, 43:

    intervallis imparibus, sed tamen pro rata parte ratione distinctis,

    divided proportionally by rule, id. Rep. 6, 18, 18; cf.:

    ex summis et infimis et mediis interjectis ordinibus ut sonis moderata ratione civitas concinit,

    in symmetrical proportion, id. ib. 2, 42, 69:

    in quo defuit fortasse ratio, sed tamen vincit ipsa rerum publicarum natura saepe rationem,

    order, system, id. ib. 2, 33, 57;

    5, 5, 7: declinatio si cum ratione fiet,

    reasonably, id. Tusc. 4, 6, 13:

    ratio et distributio,

    a reasonable division, Q. Cic. Pet. Cons. 1, 1.—
    d.
    A theory, doctrine, or system based upon reason; science, and (less freq.), subject., knowledge:

    erat enim tunc haec nova et ignota ratio, solem lunae oppositum solere deficere,

    Cic. Rep. 1, 16, 25; cf.:

    nova et a nobis inventa ratio,

    id. ib. 1, 8, 13;

    2, 39, 66: si animum contulisti in istam rationem et quasi artem,

    id. ib. 1, 23, 37; cf.:

    omnes tacito quodam sensu sine ulla arte aut ratione, quae sint in artibus ac rationibus recta ac prava dijudicant,

    id. de Or. 3, 50, 195; id. Brut. 74, 258:

    continet enim totam hanc quaestionem ea ratio, quae est de natura deorum,

    id. Div. 1, 51, 117:

    Epicuri ratio, quae plerisque notissima est,

    doctrine, system, philosophy, id. Fin. 1, 5, 13; cf.:

    Stoicorum ratio disciplinaque,

    id. Off. 3, 4, 20:

    Cynicorum ratio,

    id. ib. 1, 41, 148; so id. Fin. 3, 20, 68: ratio vivendi... ratio civilis et disciplina populorum, the art of living... statesmanship, id. Rep. 3, 3, 4; cf.:

    etiamsi cui videbitur illa in optimis studiis et artibus quieta vitae ratio beatior, haec civilis laudabilior est certe et illustrior,

    id. ib. 3, 3, 4:

    improba navigii ratio tum caeca jacebat,

    Lucr. 5, 1004: saltationis ac musicae rationis studiosi, Col. prooem. e3 al.—Subject., knowledge:

    si qua (est in me) exercitatio dicendi aut si hujus rei ratio aliqua, ab optimarum artium studiis ac disciplina profecta,

    Cic. Arch. 1, 1.—
    e.
    A view or opinion resting upon reasonable grounds:

    mea sic est ratio,

    Ter. Ad. 1, 1, 43; cf.:

    inventus est nemo, cujus non haec et sententia esset et oratio, non esse metuendum, etc.... Haec cum omnes sentirent et cum in eam rationem pro suo quisque sensu ac dolore loqueretur,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 27, § 68 sq.; and with this cf. id. Att. 1, 11, 1:

    cujus ratio etsi non valuit,

    Nep. Milt. 3, 6 (just before: hujus cum sententiam plurimi essent secuti).—
    f.
    In philos. lang., a production of proof, argumentation, reasoning: (Epicurus) tollit definitiones; nihil de dividendo ac partiendo docet;

    non, quo modo efficiatur concludaturque ratio, tradit,

    Cic. Fin. 1, 7, 22; cf. id. Div. 2, 10, 25; id. de Or. 2, 38, 158:

    ratio ipsa coget, et ex aeternitate quaedam esse vera et ea non esse nexa causis aeternis, etc.,

    id. Fat. 16, 38; cf.:

    ergo, ubi tyrannus est, ibi non vitiosam ut heri dicebam, sed, ut nunc ratio cogit, dicendum est, plane nullam esse rem publicam,

    id. Rep. 3, 31, 43.

    Lewis & Short latin dictionary > ratio

  • 9 система

    1) General subject: formation, formulary, frame, method, pattern, plan, rationale, sagene, scheme (воззрений и т.п.), scheme, set, set-up, система национальной противоракетной обороны
    6) Construction: ram-and-cable system
    9) Economy: standard
    10) Accounting: practice, regime
    11) Diplomatic term: (денежная) standard
    12) Forestry: rule
    13) Music: staff system
    14) Polygraphy: train
    15) Psychology: order
    16) Electronics: loop
    17) Information technology: application( прикладная), combination, reasoning system, repertoire, repertory
    19) Immunology: nomenclature
    20) Astronautics: environment
    21) Geophysics: configuration
    22) Food industry: solid-liquid system
    23) Atomic energy: ram and cable system
    25) Business: setup
    26) Solar energy: network
    27) Polymers: circuit, station
    30) Chemical weapons: system (SYSTEM)
    32) Psychoanalysis: theoreticalism, theosopheme
    33) Makarov: assemblage, chain (напр. станций), chain (напр., станций), institution, manifold, net-work, organization, policy, range, set (напр. ур-ний), set (напр., ур-ний), suite, works
    34) Bicycle: crank set (шатуны + звезды), crankset (шатун + закрепленные на нем звезды)
    35) Skydiving: rig (парашют)
    36) Mountain climbing: harness (страховочная)

    Универсальный русско-английский словарь > система

  • 10 ἀποφαίνω

    A show forth, display, Sol.15.33, etc.;

    ἀ. τινὶ ἐς ὄψιν Hdt. 4.81

    ;

    ἀ. τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ Ar.Nu. 352

    ;

    τινά S.Fr. 1023

    , cf. 74 ([voice] Pass.); ἀ. παῖδας ἐκ γυναικός, i.e. have children by her, Is.6.22; of the woman, produce,

    ἔφεδρον βασιλέα.. ἀ. Hdt.5.41

    ; also of the descendants, ἑπτὰ πάππους πλουσίους ἀ. produce seven generations of wealthy ancestors, Pl.Tht. 174e.
    II make known, declare,

    ὡς εἰπὼν ἀπέφηνε Batr.144

    ;

    γνώμην ἀ. περί τινος Hdt.1.40

    ; δικαίην ζόην ἀ. give evidence of a legitimate mode of living, Id.2.177; cf.B.11.
    2 show by reasoning, prove, c. part.,

    τοὺς μὲν ἀ. πεφευγότας Id.1.82

    ; ἀπέφαινε τῷ λόγῳ μιν δκαιότατον ὄντα ib.129;

    πόλλ' ἂν ἀποφήναιμ' ἐκείνους.. ἀδικουμένους Ar.Ach. 314

    ;

    ἀποφαίνω ὑμᾶς κυριωτάτους ὄντας Th.2.62

    ;

    ἀ. ἀγαθῶν.. οὖσαν αἰτίαν ἐμέ Ar.Pl. 547

    , cf. Isoc.4.139, Plb.1.15.7; with part. omitted,

    ἀ. τινὰ ἔνοχον Antipho4.2.3

    , cf.And.1.41; ἀ. τινὰ ἐχθρόν Philipp. ap. D.12.8.
    b represent, proclaim,

    ἀ. σεαυτὸν ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον Pl.Prt. 349a

    ;

    σοφὸν ἀ. τὸν Ἡσίοδον Id.Lg. 718e

    ;

    ἀντὶ φιλοσόφων μισοῦντάς τι ἀ. τινάς Id.Tht. 168b

    ; ἀ. ἡδονὴν τῶν φαύλων (sc. οὖσαν) Arist.EN 1172a30, cf.Rh.Al. 1438b19, etc.
    3 c. acc. et inf., make plain that.., Pl.R. 338e, al.; show,

    ἀ. λόγῳ ὡς.. Hdt.5.84

    ; ἀ. ὡς.., ὅτι.., Th.3.63, Pl.Phd. 95c, etc.
    4 denounce, inform against, Antipho 6.9, Lys.31.2;

    πρίν γ' ἂν τουτον ἀποφήνω.. οἷος ὢν θρασύνεται Ar.Ra. 845

    ;

    ὃν ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴ ἀποπέφαγκεν χρήματ' ἔχειν Din.1.15

    :—[voice] Pass., ἀποπέφανται μισθαρνῶν ibid.
    III give an account of, τὴν πρόσοδον, τὴν οὐσίαν, D.27.47, 42.11: esp. pay in money (to the treasury) according to accounts delivered, of public officers, Id.20.77,80: generally, of private persons,

    ἕνδεκα μνᾶς τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἀπέφηνεν Id.27.19

    ;

    ἅπαντα ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἀ. X.Oec.7.13

    .
    IV render, make so and so,

    Ἀθηναίους μικροπολίτας ἀ. Ar.Eq. 817

    , cf. X.Eq.1.11, 10.5, Luc.Somn.8.
    2 declare elected,

    τινὰς ἄρχοντας Pl.Lg. 753d

    ;

    τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους Th.8.93

    :—in [voice] Med., ἀποφήνασθαί τινα ταμίαν v.l. in Pi.N.6.25 (cf. B. III):—[voice] Pass., ἀποφαίνεσθαι εὐδοκίμου στρατιᾶς to be named (chief) of a glorious army, A.Pers. 858 codd.
    B [voice] Med., display something of one's own,

    Μοῦσαν στυγεράν A.Eu. 309

    ;

    καλὰ ἔργα Pl.Smp. 209e

    : abs., make a display of oneself, show off, X.Cyr.8.8.13.
    2 ἀ. μαρτύρια produce evidence, Hdt.5.45;

    ἀ. νόμους

     set forth, propound,

    Pl.Lg. 780a

    .
    II ἀποφαίνεσθαι γνώμην declare one's opinion, Hdt.1.207, 2.120, al., E.Supp. 335, Pl.Grg. 466c, D.4.1;

    ἀ. δόξαν Pl.R. 576e

    ;

    δόξαν περί τινος Id.Tht. 170d

    .
    2 abs., give an opinion,

    ταύτῃ ἀ. Hdt.7.143

    ;

    ἀ. περί τινος Pl.Ly. 214a

    : c.inf.,

    ἀ. κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα Id.Tht. 168b

    :—[voice] Pass.,

    καθόλου ἀ. ἐπί τινος Arist. Int. 17b3

    .
    3 give a decision or award,

    ὁ κριτὴς ἀ. Pl.R. 580b

    ;

    ἀ. περί τινος Id.Phdr. 274e

    ; ἀ. δίαιταν, of an arbitrator, D.33.19,20:— [voice] Pass.,

    τῆς διαίτης -φαινομένης Id.54.27

    .
    III [voice] Med. used like the [voice] Act., Pi.N.l.c. supr.;

    ἀ. λογισμόν X.Mem.4.2.21

    : c. inf., advise,

    τὸν.. ὑπακούειν ἀποφηνάμενον D.18.204

    .
    IV define,

    ἀ. τἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντες ἐφίενται Arist.EN 1094a2

    .

    Greek-English dictionary (Αγγλικά Ελληνικά-λεξικό) > ἀποφαίνω

  • 11 διάνοια

    διάνοια, ας, ἡ (s. διανοέομαι; Aeschyl., Hdt+.; in LXX nearly always for לֵב, לֵבָב).
    ① the faculty of thinking, comprehending, and reasoning, understanding, intelligence, mind as the organ of νοεῖν (SibOr 3, 421; Iren. 1, 14, 3 [Harv. I 135, 3]. Of God Hippol., Ref. 1, 19, 2) Hm 10, 1, 5. κατὰ διάνοιαν 1 Cl 19:3. Described as the seat of the λογισμοί Dg 2:1; as the organ of ζωή, πίστις, ἐγκράτεια 1 Cl 35:2. Darkened Eph 4:18; 1 Cl 36:2; 2 Cl 19:2; hence πηρὸς τῇ δ. maimed or blind in understanding 2 Cl 1:6 (cp. Ex 36:1 σοφὸς τῇ δ.; Job 9:4). In contrast, fixed on God (cp. Philochorus, cited 2, below) 1 Cl 35:5. Insight 1J 5:20 (Just., D. 5, 6 ἐπʼ ἄπειρον ἀεὶ τὴν δ. πέμπων). Of moral understanding Hb 8:10; 10:16 (both Jer 38:33); Hm 5, 2, 7; 11:1. W. heart and soul and mind (s. IDefixWünsch 1, 10) Mt 22:37; Mk 12:30 (ἐξ ὅλης τ. διανοίας Epict. 2, 2, 13); Lk 10:27 (Dt 6:5 v.l.); cp. 2 Cl 3:4. On τετρωμένοι κατὰ διάνοιαν GPt 7:26 s. τιτρώσκω.
    ② mind as a mode of thinking, disposition, thought, mind (Jos., Ant. 2, 19; Ath. 32, 3) εἰλικρινὴς δ. 2 Pt 3:1; καθαρὰ δ. 1 Cl 21:8; ἁπλῆ δ. 23:1; ἄμωμος δ. ITr 1:1; ὑπερήφανος διανοίᾳ καρδίας αὐτοῦ (1 Ch 29:18; Bar 1:22) proud in the thoughts of his heart Lk 1:51; ἐχθρὸς τῇ δ. hostile in attitude Col 1:21; ἀπερισπάστῳ δ. w. undisturbed mind IEph 20:2. The mind becomes discouraged Hv 3, 11, 3; disturbed 2 Cl 20:1; corrupted away fr. the Lord Hs 4:7 (contrast Philochorus [IV/III B.C.]: 328 Fgm. 188b Jac. in a hymn to a goddess concerning the devotee’s ‘pure mind’). In imagery gird up the loins of the mind 1 Pt 1:13.
    ③ mind focused on objective, purpose, plan (Jos., Vi. 158) εἰδὼς [τὴν δι]άνοιαν (as restored by edd., but w. proviso PEg2 p. 22 [s. ἄνοια]) PEg2 50f =ASyn. 280, 45. So prob. in 1 Cl 33:4, if κατὰ διάνοιαν (lacking in Lat., Syr., and Coptic transl.) is orig.: in accordance with plan.
    ④ mind as fantasizing power, imagination, in an unfavorable sense 1 Cl 39:1.
    ⑤ mind in sensory aspect, sense, impulse, in a bad sense (Num 15:39) pl. Eph 2:3.—B. 1240. EDNT. M-M. TW. Sv.

    Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά παλαιοχριστιανική Λογοτεχνία > διάνοια

  • 12 Knowledge

       It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 4, p. 25)
       It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances.
       But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. (Hume, 1975, Sec. 12, Pt. 3, pp. 163-165)
       Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the ability to receive impressions), the second is the power to know an object through these representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts).
       Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to that representation.... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical.... Pure intuitions or pure concepts are possible only a priori; empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori. If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any way affected, is to be called "sensibility," then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called "understanding." Our nature is so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.... Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (Kant, 1933, Sec. 1, Pt. 2, B74-75 [p. 92])
       Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of Reason is real, but it is also, in itself, dialectical and deceptive.... Hence to attempt to draw our principles from it, and in their employment to follow this natural but none the less fallacious illusion can never produce science, but only an empty dialectical art, in which one school may indeed outdo the other, but none can ever attain a justifiable and lasting success. In order that, as a science, it may lay claim not merely to deceptive persuasion, but to insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must exhibit in a complete system the whole stock of conceptions a priori, arranged according to their different sources-the Sensibility, the understanding, and the Reason; it must present a complete table of these conceptions, together with their analysis and all that can be deduced from them, but more especially the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori by means of their deduction, the principles of its use, and finally, its boundaries....
       This much is certain: he who has once tried criticism will be sickened for ever of all the dogmatic trash he was compelled to content himself with before, because his Reason, requiring something, could find nothing better for its occupation. Criticism stands to the ordinary school metaphysics exactly in the same relation as chemistry to alchemy, or as astron omy to fortune-telling astrology. I guarantee that no one who has comprehended and thought out the conclusions of criticism, even in these Prolegomena, will ever return to the old sophistical pseudo-science. He will rather look forward with a kind of pleasure to a metaphysics, certainly now within his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which alone can procure for reason permanent satisfaction. (Kant, 1891, pp. 115-116)
       Knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, it is yet none the less false, just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character; and it is defective because it is merely the universal, merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other counter-assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse: it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from. Negative, that is to say, in its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. (Hegel, 1910, pp. 21-22)
       Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering. (Lewis, 1946, p. 1)
       "Evolutionary epistemology" is a branch of scholarship that applies the evolutionary perspective to an understanding of how knowledge develops. Knowledge always involves getting information. The most primitive way of acquiring it is through the sense of touch: amoebas and other simple organisms know what happens around them only if they can feel it with their "skins." The knowledge such an organism can have is strictly about what is in its immediate vicinity. After a huge jump in evolution, organisms learned to find out what was going on at a distance from them, without having to actually feel the environment. This jump involved the development of sense organs for processing information that was farther away. For a long time, the most important sources of knowledge were the nose, the eyes, and the ears. The next big advance occurred when organisms developed memory. Now information no longer needed to be present at all, and the animal could recall events and outcomes that happened in the past. Each one of these steps in the evolution of knowledge added important survival advantages to the species that was equipped to use it.
       Then, with the appearance in evolution of humans, an entirely new way of acquiring information developed. Up to this point, the processing of information was entirely intrasomatic.... But when speech appeared (and even more powerfully with the invention of writing), information processing became extrasomatic. After that point knowledge did not have to be stored in the genes, or in the memory traces of the brain; it could be passed on from one person to another through words, or it could be written down and stored on a permanent substance like stone, paper, or silicon chips-in any case, outside the fragile and impermanent nervous system. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, pp. 56-57)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Knowledge

См. также в других словарях:

  • mode of reasoning — index dialectic Burton s Legal Thesaurus. William C. Burton. 2006 …   Law dictionary

  • Proportional reasoning — Proportional ReasoningProportionality is a mathematical relation between two quantities. Proportional reasoning is one of the skills a child acquires when progressing from the stage of concrete operations to the stage of formal operations… …   Wikipedia

  • applied logic — Introduction       the study of the practical art of right reasoning. The formalism (formal logic) and theoretical results of pure logic can be clothed with meanings derived from a variety of sources within philosophy as well as from other… …   Universalium

  • Logic — For other uses, see Logic (disambiguation). Philosophy …   Wikipedia

  • Descartes: methodology — Stephen Gaukroger INTRODUCTION The seventeenth century is often referred to as the century of the Scientific Revolution, a time of fundamental scientific change in which traditional theories were either replaced by new ones or radically… …   History of philosophy

  • Models of scientific inquiry — In the philosophy of science, models of scientific inquiry have two functions: first, to provide a descriptive account of how scientific inquiry is carried out in practice, and second, to provide an explanatory account of why scientific inquiry… …   Wikipedia

  • Mill, John Stuart: Logic and metaphysics — J.S.Mill Logic and metaphysics John Skorupski ENLIGHTENMENT AND ROMANTICISM IN MILL’S PHILOSOPHY Mill’s importance as one of the major figures of nineteenth century politics and culture, and the current interest in him as a moral and political… …   History of philosophy

  • Augustus De Morgan — (1806 1871) Born 27 June 1806( …   Wikipedia

  • fallacy — /fal euh see/, n., pl. fallacies. 1. a deceptive, misleading, or false notion, belief, etc.: That the world is flat was at one time a popular fallacy. 2. a misleading or unsound argument. 3. deceptive, misleading, or false nature; erroneousness.… …   Universalium

  • Marx, Karl — ▪ German philosopher Introduction in full  Karl Heinrich Marx  born May 5, 1818, Trier, Rhine province, Prussia [Germany] died March 14, 1883, London  revolutionary, sociologist, historian, and economist. He published (with Friedrich Engels)… …   Universalium

  • Sidgwick, Henry — Sidgwick C.A.J.Coady Unlike John Stuart Mill or Jeremy Bentham, Henry Sidgwick’s is hardly a household name in intellectual circles beyond the world of professional philosophy. His standing amongst many contemporary moral philosophers as possibly …   History of philosophy

Поделиться ссылкой на выделенное

Прямая ссылка:
… Нажмите правой клавишей мыши и выберите «Копировать ссылку»